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Intraday interest rates are zero. Consequently, a foreign exchange dealer can short a
vulnerable currency in the morning, close this position in the afternoon, and never face an interest
cost. This tactic might seem especially attractive in times of crisis, since it suggests an immunity
to the central bank's interest rate defense. In equilibrium, however, buyers of the vulnerable
currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as nodevaluation
occurs. That is, currencies under attack should typically appreciate intraday. Using data on
intraday exchange rate changes within the EMS, we find this prediction is borne out.
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This paper examines implications of the fact that interest rates are zero
intraday.' In particular, we focus on the foreign exchange (FX) market, and ask
whether trading strategies might be affected. The answer to this question is of
greater import than might first appear. For example, in times of crisis central
banks typically employ an interest rate defense, raising domestic rates to attract a
capital inflow and punish short-sellers. But, if dealers are immune to this defense —
atleast on an intraday basis —thenperhaps the viability of fixed rate regimes is
undermined. (Goldstein et al (1993) provide an overview of how central banks
defended their currencies during the 1992 currency crisis.)
A simple example helps. With intraday interest rates of zero, a dealer can
short a high interest rate currency in the morning, close her position in the
afternoon, and never face an interest cost. If there is any likelihood of an intraday
devaluation, this appears to be an attractive strategy, other things equal, since the
dealer is immune to the interest cost of an overnight short position.
Other things should not be equal in equilibrium, however. Buyers of the
vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain,
as long as no devaluation occurs. That is, devaluation risk is offset by systematic
apprecistion.. Further, the greater the probability and size of the devaluation, the
greater the implied appreciation. Thus, the absence of a role for the interest
differential in equating expected returns across currencies implies that the exchange
rate itself takes up the slack.
In a regression of intraday exchange rate changes on interest differentials we
find this prediction is borne out: the higher the weak currency's interest rate, the
'For details regarding settlement, see Stigum (1990), particularly pages 893—901.
1more that currency appreciates intraday. The same finding elsewhere in the
literature is referred to as "forward rate bias". Though the longer—horizon findings
—thathigh interest rate currencies tend to appreciate —remainunexplained, our's
does not: intraday, the expected cost of shorting a currency in crisis offsets the
expected gains from devaluation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model of intraday
trading in times of crisis; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 presents our
results; and Section 5 concludes.
I. A Model of Intraday Trading
Consider a single asset that is tradable in a single market at any time over a
span divided into n periods, each of length T. In order to abstract from portfolio
balance issues, we assume the asset is in zero net supply (we discuss risk premia in
our comments on intervention below). Let St denote the price of the asset at time t.
For concreteness, we associate St with the nominal exchange rate in French Francs
per Deutschemark, or FF/DM. Further, let R7 and RIM denote the per—period
nominal interest rates, in FF and DM respectively, applying to open positions. Our
core assumptions are the following:
(Al) Settlement—FX: all FX trades effected within a period are settled at period
close.
(A2) Settlement—Interest: open positions in FX involve interest on a per—period
basis, but only if open positions are carried across period close.If carried
across a period close and offset in the subsequent period, open positions accrue
a full period of interest, regardless of how far into the subsequent period the
position is maintained.
(A3) Uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds.
2Assumption (Al) is realistic since spot FX is traded over periods within which
settlement time is unchanging (in reality, settlement typically occurs two days
forward rather than at the day's "close"). Assumption (A2) captures the fact that
daily interest is a discrete variable: if one opens a position and closes it five minutes
later, but settlement of the second trade is one day later than that of the first trade,
then one full day's interest will accrue. Assumption (A3) —thoughrejected
empirically over monthly and quarterly horizons —allowsus to focus attention on
the expected return consequences of intraday trading. To our knowledge, UIP has
not been tested at this horizon (Hodrick (1987)). Henceforth, we work with with a
log—linear approximation of tJIP (the negligible size of intraday cross terms is
demonstrated below) 2
Theabove assumptions imply that:
E[3f+_sIcz]= D+(R7_RM), r< T. (1)
Here, s=log(S) and f2 denotes the representative agent's information set at time t.
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if t+r is in the period subsequent to that
containing t, and equal to 0 if t+r is in the same period as containing t. Thus, when
Dt+=0, the expected change in the log of the exchange rate must also be zero.
The expected dynamics implied by equation (1) are presented in Figure 1.
Implicit in the figure is the assumption that and RJM are constant, with
RFF'>RJ)M. The most distinctive feature is that this model generates expected
discontinuities in the exchange rate at the settlement points.3
2Wenote that any terms arising from Jensen's inequality are absorbed into the
constant of our estimating equation as long as second moments are time—invariant.
3Inreality, spot FX is settled the second business day after the transaction, so there
is a distinction between the time the settlement date (value date) advances one day,
and the time payments are actually made on the day of settlement. For our
3Figure 1
Expected Exchange Rate Behavior Over Time
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We turn to implications of the model in times of crisis. Times of crisis are
interesting because interest differentials become first—order relevant even at horizons
of one day. For example, during March, 1983 the value of RFF_RDM topped 80%
on an annual basis (30—day eurorates).It is within this extreme context that
policy—makers must evaluate the effectiveness of the interest rate defense.
In order to gauge the size of interest rate differentials on a daily basis, Table I
presents some statistics. The numbers in the columns on the right represent the size
of the periodic exchange rate discontinuities illustrated in Figure 1. (Note that the
columns are the same up to the precision reported. Hence, the cross terms that
distinguish the linear version of uncovered interest parity from the exact version are
quite small at this horizon.)
purposes, what matters is the time the value date advances one day. For the
currencies we consider below, the worldwide standard for advancing the value date
has varied between 9 PM and 10:30 PM London time (GMT) over the EMS period
(sources: bank dealers and Reuters).
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* Daily—basisvalues are expressed in 0.01%, or basis points. Eurorates (other than
Sterling) are quoted on a 360—day basis so that gross yield over t days equals
i+R(t/ 360) where R is the quoted rate [see Stigum (1981), pages 175—178]. The DM
rate used is the median quote in our sample.
The question we want to answer is this: does the lack of intraday interest rates
provide agents with a costless means of speculating against vulnerable currencies?
Our analysis follows directly from equation (1), as before, except that now we must
determine the implications of our assumptions under a positive probability of
devaluation. Clearly, the total expected change in the exchange rate must still be
zero. Accordingly, for intra—period open positions we can write:
E[st+—st(12}=pE[st+_stI deval.]+ (1—p)E[st+r_stf no deval.] =0 (2)
where p denotes the exogenous probability that a devaluation will occur between t
and t+T.With E[st+r—stI deval.]>0, thisimplies that E[st+7.—stl no devaLJ<0.
That is, conditional on no devaluation, the weak currency should appreciate on
average within the period. Figure 2 provides a qualitative illustration:
5Figure 2




A testable implication of our model as applied to crises is presented in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: Intraday, if a higher weak—currency interest rate reflects greater
expected devaluation then —conditionalon no devaluation —ahigher
weak—currency interest rate implies greater expected appreciation, ceteris paribus.
Proof: We know from equation (2) that intra—period E[st+7._stI t1 =
pE[St+rStIdeval.] + (1_p)E[st+7.—stI no deval.] =0.But, if an increase in
(R7_RIM) =>anincrease in pE[3t+rstI deval.], then pE[s+—stInO deval.]
must be lower.
This is the implication we test in the data. That is, we estimate the following
regression:
t+TO+ fi1(RIi) + (3)
6where: in the intra—day change in the log of the spot rate; R'_RMis the
interest differential (daily basis); and Ct+.i. is a stationary expectational error.
(Since t+Trepresentsnews it is orthogonal to available information such as interest
rates; hence, least squares is a consistent estimator for (3).) Proposition 1 implies
that if a higher interest differential reflects higher expected devaluation, then fi1
shouldbe negative so long as there are 'io intradaj, devaluations in the sample. (In
the sample we consider, none occurred. That said, it is important that devaluation
can occur intraday.Sweden provides an example: the November 19, 1992
devaluation occurred during business hours. Further, the devaluation was news: the
Prime Minister was apprised just ten minutes before flotation (see the Financial
Times, 11/20/92)).4
Note that under covered interest parity our regression is exactly the canonical
regression of on the forward discount. The estimated coefficients in the
literature are consistently negative for intermediate horizons, in violation of
uncovered interest parity (see Hodnck (1987) for a comprehensive discussion of
forward discount bias).In contrast, our model, derived from UIP, predict. a
negative coefficient —forintraday horizons.
H. Data and Related Issues
Our empirical implementation uses two currencies within the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS): the French Franc and
the Italian Lira, both relative to the German DM, anchor of the ERM. A number of
factors are relevant for our choice of data. First, we need fixed exchange rates to
get the devaluation possibility that drives the model.Second, we need high
4Notethat if a large sample were available —i.e.,one that includes a representative
number of intraday devaluations —onewould expect a value of zero forunder
IJIP.
7expected devaluation —proxiedby high interest differentials —otherwisethe
implied intraday drift is too small to detect. Third, the ERM dominates both
Bretton Woods and developing—country possibilities: more crises were defended with
high interest rates than under Bretton Woods, and institutional issues are not the
problem they would be in the developing—country context (e.g., capital controls,
thin markets, etc.). Finally, within the ERM, the French Franc and Italian Lira
account for the lion's share of high interest differential observations. Indeed, there
are still relatively few attacks of the magnitude we require; hence, we pool our data
across countries.(See also Svensson (1993) for further evidence regarding the
intrinsic appeal of the ERM as a target of analysis.)
Our sample runs from 3/13/79 to 10/26/92, which includes a total of 3555
weekdays. We construct FF/DM and IL/DM rates (IL denotes Italian Lira) using
dollar quotes, i.e., the FF/DM rate equals (FF/$)($/DM). Our end—of—period rates
are the daily London close quotes (midpoints) from the Financial Times, which over
this period were recorded at 5 PM London time. Our beginning—of—period rates are
European Currency Unit (ECU) fix rates recorded at 2:15 Swiss time (1:15 London
time) by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). There is no spread for the
ECU fix series, since fixings are auctions. Finally, these fix series are the earliest
consistent series available for London trading hours, to our knowledge.
Our interest rate data for the FF, IL, and DM are the 30—day euro—currency
rates recorded at lOAM Swiss time (9 AM London time) by the BIS. As euro—rates,
they are virtually free of political risk. The 30—day market is deeply traded; we also
use 2—day rates for a robustness check.
We need to determine a definition of a crisis in terms of interest differentials
5Notethat the interest cost of an overnight short position is tied to a for-ward
interest rate, from t+2 days to t+3 days, since spot deliveries are typically two days
forward. This has no bearing, however, on the fact that the interest cost of an
intraday short position is zero.
8since our model's non—zero drift prediction is only relevant during times of crisis.
The larger the cutoff interest differential, the larger the implied drift, but the cost is
lower statistical power since the available sample 8hnnks rapidly. Our preferred
cutoff is a ten percent interest differential (annual basis), RF''_RDM or
although we present results for different thresholds. This preference is based on
three factors. First, a ten percent differential is large enough to be a strong signal of
crisis. Second, on a daily basis, a ten percent differential is large enough to imply a
drift that is not dominated by typical spreads (Lyons (1993b) finds a 2 basis point
median spread in DM/$ transactions data; note that Reuters' indicative quotes
overstate inter—dealer spreads by a factor of 2 or 3). Third, ten percent is not so
large as to limit severely our sample size.
Parenthetically, though intervention often takes place during crises, this does
not vitiate our results. Unsterilized intervention —themore important for the FX
market —haseffects that are captured by the interest rates in our model. One
could argue that intraday unsterilized intervention is not reflected in the morning
interest rates, and creates bias in our regression since it systematically goes in the
support direction. This argument is flawed, however: it neglects the fact that only
innovations in intervention should impact the exchange rate; what matters is
departures from expected intervention, not just the direction. In addition, we view
the case for sizeable portfolio—balance effects from sterilized intervention as weak,
especially given the point about innovations above (see Edison (1992)). Irrespective
of these arguments, though, if the data generate a significant negativein
equation (3) then there is a cost to shorting vulnerable currencies intraday, whether
the source is intervention or not. Of course, if central banks are the only buyers
earlier in the day, then perhaps they do not require the expected appreciation that
maintains UIP. This possibility makes a finding of a significant negativeall the
more striking.
9ifi. Estimation Results
Table II presents our OLS results. To get a sense of the sensitivity of our
sample size and results to the interest differential, we provide estimates for three
different cutoffs: 10%, 15%, and 20% on an annual basis. To provide more
interpretable coefficients, we translate the annualized interest differentials to a daily
basis [using the Table 1 formula (Rt_RIM)/360, where Rt and RI)M are annual
basis quotes, anddenotes either R'For R1 as appropriate.].
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* isthe change in the log of the exchange rate over the intraday holding
period, in FF/DM or IL/DM as appropriate. RçRM is the nominal interest
differential, daily basis, where Rt denotes either or as appropriate. OBS
denotes number of observations meeting the interest differential cutoff criterion. The
criterion ￿iO% denotes observations for which the own—currency interest rate is at
least 10% higher than the DM interest rate on an annual basis. Similarly for the
other criteria. Estimated using OLS. Sample: 3/13/79 to 10/26/92. T—tatistics in
parentheses.
10The results are clear: the greater the interest differential, the more the
vulnerable currency appreciates intraday.6 The implications of our model are
apparently borne out in the data.
We can go further and interpret themagnitudes, but this introduces the
knotty problem of translating trading hours into trading days.With some
simplifying assumptions, it is easy to show that UIP predicts —1.7Again, the
prediction works well: while '= 0 can be rejected at conventional levels of
statistical significance, the hypothesis that —1 cannot.
IV. Conclusions
Our first result derives from analysis of our model: intraday interest rates of
zero do not imply that agents have a costless means of speculating against
vulnerable currencies within the day. On the contrary, if the interest differential
cannot do its work then exchange rate dynamics have to take up the slack. Further,
if expected returns are to be equated, then the larger the expected devaluation, the
more the vulnerable currency is expected to appreciate within any day in which a
devaluation does not occur.
6 We conduct three types of sensitivity analysis: (1) we use 2—day interest rates
instead of 30—day rates, (2) we split the data by country, and (3) we bootstrap the
standard errors. The 2—day interest rates produce a negative and highly significant
fi1. The country results are weaker for Italy: thoughFrance alone still generates a
significantly negative /5], Italy does not. Finally, bootstrapped standard errors are
roughly twice as large as conventionally—calculated standard errors, but are
conditional on independence of the residuals over time, a strong assumption in this
context. The reported t—statistics use conventionally—calculated standard errOrs.
7 The assumptions are: (i) per proposition 1, the daily—basis Rt_RM—
pE[st+.7.—stl devaL] where r is the length of a trading day, (ii) our empiricalmeasure
of 3t+r3t corresponds to one trading day, and (iii) p is small, 80 that (l—p) is close
to 1. To see that UIP predicts fi=—1,note that equation (2) implies E[st+r_StI no
devaL] = —(1--py'(pE[st+—stI deval.]) _<Rt_RM).
11Our second result is empirical: our analytical results are borne out in the data.
The larger the expected devaluation —proxiedby the interest differential— the
more the vulnerable currency appreciates intraday. Hence, dealers are not immune
to the central bank's interest rate defense within the day. That said, the implied
intraday drifts are not large. This kind of an effect is irrelevant for all but the
lowest transaction—cost participants at times of substantial devaluation risk.
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